Secularization

Here's the brief response paper I gave at the secularization event.

The mundane against the secular: some thoughts

First, a simple observation about institutional position. The research university has long been at the heart of European, and thence global secularism, if we think of secularism as the progressive social/intellectual distantiation from supernaturalisms. The implications of this press on us not least because it means that academic anti-secularist arguments risk bad faith. And it means that such arguments, even if inspired by non-European situations, can’t avoid questions about their relation to European political theory and, in particular, to the tradition of counter-revolutionary critique of secular progressive modernity whose most recent manifestation has been that transnational new right which, as Jan-Werner Müller has shown, draws inspiration from Carl Schmitt. The structural link between European conservative political theology and post-colonial anti-secularism leads to strange encounters. For example: it would not be hard to deploy Carl Schmitt’s postwar affirmation of the anti-liberal, anti-democratic partisan for a sympathetic account of contemporary jihadism.
At the same time, as we know, the division between the secular and non-secular is less hard edged than it seems. To offer a well-trodden example from the US abortion debate: is ‘the right to life’ a secular or religious principle? Even ‘the right to choose’ can be regarded as religiously sanctioned if we pursue Harold Laski’s supposition that ‘the affirmation of the right of each human being to fulfill his individuality” constitutes Christianity’s best contribution to world civilization. Indeed the political cogency of abortion-debate sound-bites depends on their grounds being indeterminable in regard to secularism. Such strategic ambiguity poses difficulties for Habermas whose argument, I think, depends on a hard distinction between propositions that are amenable to ‘secular justifications’ in ‘public political debate’ and those that are not. But the abortion debate exposes the appropriateness of secular justification as such to question since secular justification for life, say, can threaten rather than supplement life’s religious sanction. In instances like this, as Charles Taylor has implied, opposing parties meet not on the basis of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus but on joint submission to an established social order, happily or not.
In modern societies one of the goods offered by this established social order (let’s call it nation-state capitalism) is what I’ll call the secular adiaphora— the world of consumption and entertainment which is equally indifferent to (if not independent from) religion, politics and enlightened knowledge. Mediatized entertainment is of special interest because, for all its indifference to religion and politics, it provides both with so many of their resources and can thus transform them, and not just in the West. Originally, before the Christian era, ‘secular’ meant “of the ages”—profane human life’s sheer duration and rhythms. The contemporary secular adiaphora—a ceaseless stream of celebrities, fictions, fashion and sport—has, for all its non-secular utilities, structural affinities to that primordial concept. For the secular adiaphora marks the persistence of the simple human capacity to live on: to inhabit continuous mundane repetition. In this case the Pascalian realm of ‘distraction’ is transubstantiated into a fundamental condition of temporal being. And this sphere binds societies today. It’s also where secular distantiations from liberal state secularity can emerge in echoes of the ethos of a secular anti-secularism given philosophic force by Nietzsche. Or as one could also say: the secular adiaphora is not just where the secular loses its ties to enlightened reason and progress but where it is absorbed by the mundane.
These remarks rub against Gil Anidjar’s fascinating paper and in particular his claim, following Ashish Nandy and T.N. Madan, that we should regard Christianity as the agent of European colonialism by recognizing that Christianity has ‘disenchanted its own world by dividing itself into private and public, politics and economics, indeed religious and secular”. In making this move, Anidjar asks us to dethrone concepts like modernity and capitalism as master signifiers of European domination. Andijar comes to his argument in rescuing Edward Said from himself by showing that Said was not the secularist he claimed to be. It’s worth recalling that Said himself often thought of his secularism as a commitment to ‘affiliation’ (against ‘filiation’) two aspects of which are pertinent here. Said was committed to associational identities and collectivities against nativist ones like race, nationality and inherited religious confession. And he was committed to an analytic method which, in the poststructuralist mode, seeks to find exchanges, flows, mutations rather than autonomies and antinomies. It may be that Said could not logically commit himself simultaneously to programmatic secularism and to affiliation to the degree that the latter breaks down the hard distinction between the secular and the Christian along the lines that Andijar proposes. From this perspective, Andijar seems right to recognise a tension between Said’s anti-orientalism and his secularism. But affiliation also breaks down the hard distinction between Christianity and other religions so as to prevent us conceiving of the history of imperial modernity as religious warfare in Andijar’s spirit or indeed in Samuel Huntington’s.
My own inclination would not be to pursue Andijar along this theoretical track but to invite him to spell out the historical evidence on which his case must ultimately rest, as well as to explore counter-instances. His argument, after all, is finally more historical than theoretical. So I’d invite him to tell us more about both non-Christian secularities and the reception of Christianity outside the boundaries of the West. (China might be an instructive case: the impact of the Jesuit mission created a stronger and codified Confucianism, a religion of empire to use Chris Bayley’s phrase, directed against Western trade and exchange while later Protestant missions sparked the millenarial offshoot of Christian soteriology that led to the bloody Taiping rebellion against both the Qing regime and the British. In both cases Christianization hardened anti-imperialist resistance in terms that complicate Andijar’s argument). But let me end these brief remarks by citing an old case of non-European secularity from the Europe-Asia trade-route. As recorded in Halycut, sometime around 1550 CE in today’s Iran, an English trader met a traveller from Gujurat. The man from Gujurat was “asked concerning his opinion in religion, what he thought of God” and replied “the three chief religions in the world be of the Christians, Jewes, and Turks, and yet but one of them true: but being in doubt which is the truest of the three, [I] will be of none”. In an ambiguously non-religious gesture he chose instead to worship the sun, that natural symbol of a life’s secular duration. Can we parse that worship of eternal return as a moment in a Nietzschean secular anti-secularism which today may take the form of non-participation in liberal progressivism, a form of non-participation most popularly available through immersion in industrialized, mediatised culture itself? An immersion in that culture which (to draw upon the rich array of Christian attitudes to the world albeit in a profoundly unchristian (and unNietzschean spirit)) at the very least does not preclude charitable contemplation of that culture by intellectuals like me.

Odo Marquard

Some concepts from Odo Marquard and in particular his collection of essays and talks, In Defense of the Accidental. Marquard is, as he says of himself, a philosophic belle-lettrist: he is not a theorist or a philosopher. But maybe we can think of him as a weak historical phenomenologist. At any rate, he's a conservative, and most of all in his refusal of any kind of materialism. This means he grants a concept like capitalism no explanatory force. But since in the end he accepts modernity, he's a rather qualified conservative by German standards anyway. He isn't engaged in commentary on other people's works, or in obvious debate with other philosophers. Although his concepts develop out of Weber, Gehlen, Schleher, Koselleck, Runge, Ritter, Heidegger, Blumenberg...he's not a disciple in the sense that Zizek is a disciple of Lacan for instance. In the end he's in Hume's tradition I suspect: a skeptic, looking for institutions and practices to control a social order that threatens to submerge us. It's a very different mode of writing than that which has currency in the anglophone academy. At its best its sparky and original, at worst its sermonic, somewhat obvious and cliched.

Anyway: some concepts

"Acceleration conformism": accommodation to the speeding up of history under modernity. The notion of acceleration is developed by Burkhardt. And acceleration conformism has some rather highly mediated consequences, and in particular a hanging on to continuities and traditions. It also produces notions like universal history in particular, which attempts to regularise acceleration. (The problem here is: what exactly accelerates?).

His defence of metaphysics: it is because metaphysics is interminably incomplete, raises more questions than it can possibly answer and so is open to ceaseless debate that we should resist the temptation to ditch it.

"Tribunalization": this is a by product of Marquard's claims about theodicy. For Marquard, theodicy is one basis for modern secular thought, a notion that spins off from Blumenberg's (rather unhistorical) ideas about gnosticism. For Marquard, around 1700, traditional justifications of God's creation (and in particular for God's tolerance of suffering and evil) mutated into a demand for justification of creation itself. The key text in this move being Leibnitz's Theodicy in which 1) God is removed as an agent upon worldly events and 2) everything that happens in the world happens for the best. This latter notion depends on what Marquard thinks of as "tribunalization of the world" (ie. a judging of it from inside it). (But note that this idea exists in a certain neo-Platonism: see Richard Hooker.) Here Leibniz also introduces a concept of compensation: the evil in the world is outweighed by, or is compensated for by, the good. This form of thought will become common in modernity. Man himself becomes the object of the tribunal or of critique and escapes by anointing himself his own redeemer through the notion of progress (which Marquard hates).

"The age of unworldliness [Weltfremdheit]": this is an expansion of the acceleration conformism notion. Because history now move too quickly to provide the terms for self-understanding and analysis, (because where we start from in a project will never provide the terms for its completion), thought is driven into strange aporias of which one of the most important is: modernisation as progress versus modernisation as fall. There is no getting beyond such aporias which constitute "unworldliness' or an estrangement from the world. But the acceleration of the world also infantalises us, since experience is replaced by information which needs to be taken on trust as our primary basis for knowledge. This infantalization, and the emphasis on life as continual learning and schooling is one of the reasons for our doubleness in relation to the world. In the age of unworldliness both fiction and scepticism become more common. Fictions because (as 'models') we increasingly needs props to simplify the conditions of existence (a version of Vaihanger' neo-Kantianism), and hence it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle the fictive from the real.

New Zealand

One of the really good things about New Zealand is that it hasn't developed a strong cultural nationalism. That's because of the Maori/Pakeha split and because it was in England's shadow for so long. Obviously there's a strong patriotism focussed on the All Blacks, the country's physical charm etc, but that falls far short of the kind of nationalist/xenophic pride of Australia or the US for instance.

Towards a book

Some ideas as I prepare to turn a bunch of articles I have written over the past few years into a book (or actually two books).

The beginning of an introduction
This book describes moments in the institutional history of literary culture, if we understand that culture to include the academic humanities. But it is motivated by a particular political fear— that the current globally hegemonic regime of democratic capitalist nation-states is impossible to replace and yet is systemically, pathologically flawed. We are stuck with national-democratic capitalism for the foreseeable future since it and it alone is the political system that rationality (as we know it) legitimates and since it provides so many goods and is so open to reform. But for all that it is destructive of human capacities. It would still be destructive were able to create a just society within its framework , since what it destroys is autonomy and the will to think and (though less so), happiness, none of which concern justice. I realize that this is an extraordinarily contentious assertion whose various premises elide a library of debate. But for me, here, it’s a question not of truth but of fear.
And that fear has led me to break with the main currents of cultural studies which, as we shall see, are embedded not in exit from the system (revolution, mysticism, quietism for instance) but in reformism. This is not to say that reformism is to be rejected in practice. That would in effect to be return to classical communism or to varieties of anti-worldly Christianity. It is to say that reformism is a secondary and profoundly limited game, which lies at the heart of our intellectual life only as a sign of the system's pathologizing march. And yet it has not led me into the arms of those who are indeed enemies of national-democratic capitalism and who do have a vital presence in the academic humanities




1. the relation between Perry Anderson's argument about the aristocracy/bourgeoisie alliance in Britain and its creation of a 'corporate' working class not able to gain hegemony and the Hopkins/Cain 'gentlemanly capitalism' account of British imperialism?
2. the strange connection between neo-Maoists like Badiou and conservatives like Leo Strauss in so far as both reject historicism in their attempt to imagine an other to or exit from democratic capitalism. Of course their form of anti-historicism differs considerably, although there's a sense in which Badiou's ontological nominalism is not so different from Strauss's embrace of ancient wisdom as might appear from their relative placing on the political map.